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Introduction
One of the key issues in understanding how tax policies affect labor supply is the intrahousehold allocation of time and consumption. This is in particular the case of welfare benefits, such as the Working Family Tax Credit program in the U.K. and the Earned Income Tax Credit in the U.S., aimed at providing work incentives and a safety net against poverty at the same time. The models used to address these issues typically take the household as a unit with unitary preferences (e.g. Eissa and Hoynes, 2004) ; and while the collective models of the family (Chiappori 1988 (Chiappori , 1992 ) offer a solution for improvement by modeling intrahousehold resource allocation, the interest of this framework for policy evaluation is hampered by its inability to predict the impact of welfare policies on the sharing rule. 2 The evaluation of welfare policies for the family thus ultimately requires an equilibrium model of match formation and intra-household resource allocation. The present paper offers an attempt at constructing and estimating such a model.
A very popular approach uses Nash bargaining 3 within a search-matching equilibrium framework in order to endogenize the threat points. They aim to analyze and explain a number of stylized socio-demographic trends such as declining marriage rates or increasing female college graduation rates, and various policies affecting the family. 4 This literature focusses on long term trends and individual heterogeneity is usually minimal in these models. In parallel, a very important theoretical effort was made to understand the conditions for existence and unicity of the equilibrium, and the conditions for sorting in a search-matching model with two-sided heterogeneity. 5 Up to now, there has been very little empirical work using this approach. We are only aware of Wong (2003) , who estimates the Shimer-Smith model assuming that individuals differ in a single index of observables.
Two-sided matching has initially been conceived in a perfect information framework (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1992 , for a survey). This approach was very successfully applied to designing practical matching mechanisms such as the National Resident Matching Program. However, it is only recently that, long after Becker's seminal work (Becker, 1973 (Becker, , 1974 (Becker, , 1981 , the perfect-information assignment framework of Shapley and Shubik (1971) was used to address empirical matching issues. 6 These papers feature essentially static matching models with discrete individual types. This paper builds on Shimer and Smith (2000) and designs a search-matching model of the marriage market with labor supply. There are many reasons for engineering a search model of the marriage market. First, casual experience seems to suggest that it takes time and trial to find the right partner, and that mismatch is not a rare event. Second, forward looking behavior and risk are natural ingredients of search-matching models.
In our model as in collective models, spouses' labor supply are chosen efficiently along the Pareto frontier of the achievable set. The outside option is the value of remaining single, which is equal to the instantaneous utility of the wage plus the option value of an eventual future marriage. Couples are formed if an excess of public good is produced in the association. The resulting surplus is split between spouses by Nash bargaining. As a result, the model generalizes both the collective labor supply literature, to which we add an explicit mechanism behind spouses bargaining power, and marriage market models, to which we provide a structural foundation for the surplus function driving matching decisions.
Despite a rather complicated structure the model remains tractable thanks to the 5 See e.g. Sattinger (1995) , Lu and McAfee (1996) , Burdett and Coles (1997) , Shimer and Smith (2000) , Sattinger (2003) , Eeckhout (1999) , Eeckhout and Kircher (2010b,a) . 6 See Choo and Siow (2006) , Choo, Seitz, and Siow (2008b,a) , Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2008) , Siow (2009) , Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009) , Chiappori, Salanie, and Weiss (2010) , Galichon and Salanié (2010) , Salanié and Galichon (2011) , Chiappori and Oreffice (2008) , Chiappori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque (2010a,b) . steady state assumption. Although an important application of the matching framework is understanding long-term demographic changes such as increasing divorce and remarriage rates, we assume that these changes are slow enough for a steady state to hold at least approximately at all times. In other words, flows can vary over time in a trended or cyclical way, but net flows must remain small compared to gross flows. We show that steady-state flow conditions deliver important identifying restrictions on matching probabilities, and indirectly on the relationship between intrahousehold transfers and wages.
Under the steady-state restriction, a lot of information can be drawn from cross-section data. The matching probability is thus linked to cross-section wage distributions in a simple way. Despite a small correlation between spouses' wages (30% using SIPP data) we find that the matching probability increases in both wages at a very fast rate. Its shape is rather flat for most wages but very steep when both wages cross the median. We take this result as a strong indication of positive assortative matching, albeit unconventional.
We also observe that married men work more than single men and single women, who work more than married women. The model is able to explain these facts without naively assuming that men have a preference for work and women a preference for leisure. We decompose the time that is not spent working for a wage into leisure and home-production time uses. Then, we show how a comparative advantage of women for home-production in marriage betrays itself in recognizable patterns of wage distributions, and explains married women's specialization in household production.
The labor supply literature has been faced with the problem of spurious correlations between hours worked and wages. The traditional approach is to look for instruments.
We are not claiming here that we can solve the problem without instruments. In fact, we will see that even without any correlation between preference for leisure and ability the identification of income effects rests on one non-identified parameter, the variance of match-specific shocks. Yet we believe that this framework is useful in that it shows how one can relate empirical matching regularities to unobservable time uses that play an important role in the measure of individual welfare.
The layout of the paper is as follows. First we construct the model. Second we study identification. Third we estimate the model non parametrically. The last section concludes. An appendix details the numerical techniques used to perform the nonparametric analyses.
The model
The model builds on Shimer and Smith (2000) , which we extend to allow for labor supply decisions and home production. So-doing, we considerably enrich the nature of the resource allocation process at work inside the household. Moreover, in Shimer-Smith, couples are formed because of complementarities in the match production function. In our model, agents egotistically derive utility from their own consumption and leisure.
However, the consumption good can be either purchased or produced at home. Complementarities show up in household production, which is the externality that generates surplus and explains marriage.
Individual types
We consider a marriage market with L m males and L f females. The number of married couples is denoted by N and the respective numbers of single males and single females
Individuals differ in ability, x ∈ [x, x] for males and y ∈ [y, y] for females, later assumed to be equal to labor market wages. In this paper, individual ability is the only permanent source of individual heterogeneity, as in Becker's seminal work on marriage. (1)
Equilibrium flows
We assume that only singles search for a partner, ruling out meetings with alternative partners during marriage. The number of meetings per period is a function of the numbers of male and female singles,
is the instantaneous probability that a searching individual of gender i = m, f meets with a single of the other sex. We
All datings do not end up in wedlock. We assume that there exists a function α(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] equal to the probability that a match (x, y) be consummated. This matching probability is an equilibrium outcome that will later be derived from fundamentals. The matching set is the support of α. Matches are exogenously dissolved with instantaneous probability δ.
In steady state, flows in and out of the stocks of married couples of each type must exactly balance each other out. This means that, for all (x, y),
The left-hand side is the flow of divorces. The right-hand side is the flow of new (x, y)marriages. It has three components: a single male of type x, out of the u m (x) ones, meets a single female with probability λ m ; this woman is of type y with probability u f (y)/U f ; the knot is tied with probability α(x, y).
Integrating equation ( 
By symmetry, the equation defining the equilibrium distribution of wages in the population of single females is
Time use for singles
Individuals draw utility from consumption and leisure. Consider a woman (with similar definitions for males) with direct utility V f (c, ) for consumption of a unique good c and leisure . The consumption good can be either purchased or produced at home. Let k denote the time devoted to home production. Assuming that ability, labor productivity and wage are all equal, as in a competitive labor market, a female consumer seeks to solve the optimization problem: max c, ,h,k>0 V f (c, ), subject to the budget constraint c = yh + H f (k), for hours worked h = T − k − , where T is total time endowment and H f (k) is the home production function for a single women. For simplicity, we only consider interior solutions, ruling out labor market non participation, and we assume that time is the only input for home production.
Let k 0 f (y) denote the solution to the home production problem:
Then, optimal leisure is 0
Linear utility.
Specifically, we will assume the following functional form for the indirect utility function:
where R denotes total income, B f (y) is an aggregate price index, with B f (0) = 1, and A f (y) is a minimum expenditure level necessary to attain positive utility, with A f (0) = 0.
Linearity with respect to total income will induce a simple rent sharing mechanism. But other specifications are possible.
The leisure demand function, f (y, R), then follows from indirect utility by application of Roy's identity,
where ∂ y and ∂ R denote partial derivatives, a prime (such as in b f and A f ) denotes a derivative, and b f (y) = log B f (y). A standard specification is A f (y) = ya f and B f (y) = y b f , yielding the linear expenditure system,
Time use for married individuals
Marriage allows individuals to benefit from economies of scale and task specialization.
At the household level, let home production be H(k m , k f ) + z, a function of the time spent in home production by both spouses, k m , k f . We also introduce a source of match heterogeneity, z, which is a match-specific shock that is drawn at the first meeting from a zero-mean distribution denoted G. It aims at capturing in a tractable way all other dimensions of mutual attractiveness but labor market productivity. 8 Designing empirically tractable multidimensional matching models with random search is definitely a promising area for further research. 9
Let k 1 m (x, y), k 1 f (x, y) denote optimal home production time uses for male and female partners, defined as the solution to the problem
Determining leisure for each household member can be done if we know how home production output, C(x, y) + z, is shared between them. Let t m , t f denote a particular allocation, with
Then, leisure follows as 1
in equation (8), assuming that individual preferences for consumption and leisure are independent of marriage status.
The next section shows how transfers t m , t f are agreed upon by both spouses.
Optimal rent sharing between spouses
Let W 1 m (v, x) denote the present value of marriage for a married male of type x receiving a flow utility v and let W 0 m (x) denote the value of singlehood (derived in the next subsection). The flow value of a marriage contract delivering v utils is
where r is the discount rate and the second term of the right-hand side is the option value of divorce. We define the marriage surplus for males as
with a similar definition for females.
Spouses have to decide on a particular partition (t m , t f ) of the home-produced good.
Although transfers can be positive or negative, both should be positive in equilibrium, otherwise one individual is better off remaining single. We assume that spouses share resources cooperatively using Generalized Nash Bargaining, with bargaining coefficient β, whereby transfers t m and t f solve
Linear utility. With linear indirect utility (equation (7)) the solution is trivially found
where we denote
Functions s m and s f are the non labor income equivalents of annuities rW 0 m (x), rW 0 f (y). 10
Two dating bachelors decide to match if the total surplus is positive, i.e. s(x, y)+z > 0
The matching probability then follows as
The value of singlehood
The value of being single solves the option-value equation,
where the second term of the right-hand side is the option value of meeting a female single.
Using the expression for marriage surplus (9), and substituting s m (x) for rW 0 m (x)
using (12), we obtain
A similar expression can be derived for females,
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a fixed point (u m , u f , s m , s f ) of the following system of equations, where the first two equations determine equilibrium wage distributions for singles (derived from (3) and (4)), and the last two equations determine equilibrium values of singlehood:
We write equations (18), (19) in that form so that s m and s f become fixed points of contracting operators given u m and u f (see Shimer and Smith, 2000) .
Shimer and Smith prove the existence of an equilibrium for a simpler version of the model. They consider a symmetric equilibrium with a quadratic matching function (i.e.
λ constant). The common distribution of singles (u = u m = u f ) is then the solution to an equation similar to equations (3) or (4),
that can be shown to be contracting once u is reparameterized as v = log(u). However, the general equilibrium fixed-point operator that involves α as well as u is not globally contracting. Shimer and Smith show that an equilibrium exists but it is not necessarily unique. Troeger and Noeldeke (2009) prove the existence of an equilibrium in u for all α (the first step of Shimer and Smith's proof) for the linear matching case (λ = 1/ √ U ).
In the following sections, we use SIPP data to explore the empirical content of this equilibrium, i.e. we want to know how much on the exogenous parameters can be learnt from cross-section data on individual wages and labor supply by marriage status.
Data
In this section we present the data used in estimation, and we emphasize a few salient facts on wage and hour distributions that the model is challenged to replicate.
Demography of marriages and divorces
In the U.S. in 2001, 30.1% of men (24.6% of women), 15 years and plus, were not married and 21 % (23.1%) were divorcees (Kreider, 2005) . The median age at first marriage was 1945 to 1950 to 1955 to 1960 to 1945 to 1950 to 1955 to 1960 24 for men and 21.8 for women. Table 1 displays the percents of men and women of various cohorts who had married at least once at different ages. People are generally getting married later, but women persistently earlier than men.
In 2001, the median duration of first marriages was 8.2 and 7.9 years, respectively, for men and women. The median duration between first divorce and remarriage, for those married two times, was 3.3 years and 3.5, and second marriages lasted 9.2 and 8.1 years on average. About 75-80% of first marriages, depending on cohorts, reached 10 years, 60-65% 20 years, 50-60% 30 years. This indicates a separation rate of around 2.5% per
year. For second marriages, 70-80% reached 10 years, 55% 15 years, and 50% 20 years, consistently with a slightly higher separation rate, around 3% annual.
According to survival data the median marriage duration should therefore be of 23-28 years instead of 8-9 years. The Poisson assumption is at odds with the data because a large proportion of marriages never end, and those who end in divorce do it relatively fast, in the first two years. One way of making divorce rates non stationary in the model is to permit z to change rapidly. Thus, marriages resulting from a very large z would end fast if new, likely lower values were soon drawn. At this stage, the data seem to promise a low return for an economic theory of matching. Such a small correlation between x and y tends to indicate a very little amount of sorting based on wages. However, the estimation of the model has some interesting surprises in store. Figure 2 displays nonparametric kernel estimates of mean hours (per month) given own wage for single and married individuals. A clear ordering appears: married males work more than single males and females, who work much more than married females. Marriage seems to allow men to specialize in wage-work and women in household-production.
Wage and labor supply data

Wage distributions
Hours
However, when males' wages increase the difference in hours worked between married males and singles gets smaller, and the reverse is true for women. Lastly, we compare total earnings for married couples to earnings for singles by calculating earnings differentials, i.e. the difference between couples' earnings and singles' earnings at same wages, i.e. Figure (4) ). The earnings differential is non monotone in female wages. The highest differential is obtained for high-wage men and low-wage women. The lowest differential is for high-wage women and low-wage men. For most of the distribution of couples' wages, the differential is positive, but for high-wage females married with low-wage males it is negative.
Steady state and matching probabilities
In this section, we use the steady-state restriction (2) to identify and estimate the shape of the matching probability α(x, y) as a function of wages. Before that, we first argue that the steady-state assumption is an acceptable first-order approximation, even in a changing macro-environment, and we discuss a calibration for the divorce rate.
Divorce rates
The steady-state equation (2), by relating marriages to divorces, makes it possible to use data on first marriage ages to learn about marriage duration and divorce frequency. In addition it can help to tell us which estimate in the bracket [2.5, 8] percent per year to choose for δ in the estimation of other structural parameters.
The average probability for a single man of type x to randomly meeting a single woman and marry her is defined by
At the steady-state equilibrium described by equation (2), we have
with a similar formula for single women. The average marriage rate among single men is the expectation of this quantity:
Using the data displayed in Table 1 on the distribution of first marriage age of the 1955-1959 cohort we estimate both the age at which individuals start searching for a partner (age 0m and age 0f ) and δ by running joint regressions of log survival probabilities on search durations:
where S m (t), S f (t) denotes the probability of not being married by age t respectively for The estimated divorce rate is δ = 8.0% annual. Figure 5a shows the fit of this simple model, which is good. The implied median first marriage duration is 8.7 years (mean of 12.6 years) and is remarkably similar to the value that can be directly estimated from divorce data.
The median waiting time before marriage is estimated 8.1 years for men (mean of 11.7) and 9.0 years for women (mean of 13.0). Figure 5b plots the implied average search durations by gender and wage (i.e. log(2)/µ i (x), i = m, f ). Low wage individuals have to wait for a very long time, and women more than men. The waiting time decreases with the wage. So, women get married before men but start searching earlier and take longer.
We obtain this result because there are more female singles (7,098) than male singles (6, 386) in the sample. Given its simplicity, the model can only explain this difference from different wage distributions and different effects of wages on preferences and marriage externality. Of course, many other factors can explain the relative male scarcity in the marriage market, such as a higher mortality rate.
In the end, we conclude that the steady-state assumption is a reasonable approximation because estimates of marriage duration from data on wedlock age are consistent with direct observation. However, Table 1 seems to indicate that marriage and divorce habits do change over time, younger cohorts marrying both later and divorcing more often. This also happens with unemployment rates, for example, which do fluctuate over time (between 4% and 10% for the U.S.). Still the steady-state approximation-job destruction rate divided by job destruction rate plus job finding rate-is a very good approximation. This is because inflows and outflows may fluctuate over time, yet they do so in such a way that net flows remain small compared to gross flows in all circumstances, which is what the steady-state restriction effectively means.
The matching probability
The equilibrium flow condition (2) implies that
So the matching probability is identified up to the multiplicative factor λ (or λ/δ) from the observed distributions of wages among singles and couples.
In absence of (good) data on datings, it is extremely difficult to separate the meeting probability from the probability of matching given meeting. In order to show the implied shape of α(x, y) we thus arbitrarily choose λ so that the meeting rate is twice a year for men (λ m = 1/6). The shape of the implied matching probability, as a function of wages, is unaffected by this choice. Note that it is likely that no wage combination (x, y) can induce marriage for sure: α(x, y) ≤ 1 for all (x, y). This condition imposes the lower bound max x,y n(x,y) um(x)u f (y) = 1.37e − 03 on λ/δ, or a minimum meeting rate for men of λ m = .065, or a maximum of 15 datings per year. Figure 6 displays the estimated matching probability function obtained by replacing wage densities in equation (21) by the estimates plotted in Figure 1 . It is unambiguously increasing in both wages. More precisely, the matching probability increases at accelerated rate with both wages. It is rather flat for wages below the median with high-wage women having a very low probability of matching with anybody else but a high-wage man. This pattern indicates that positive assortative mating is definitely at work in the marriage market albeit mostly in the upper tail of the wage distribution (hence the low overall correlation between spouses' wages).
Transfers and sharing rule
We now turn to the identification of transfers t m , t f , and the sharing rule in particular, defined by the proportion t m /(t m + t f ).
Let σ be the standard deviation of the distribution of the match-specific component z and define G 0 as the distribution of z/σ, that is G(z) = G 0 (z/σ). α(x, y) ).
Average transfers
Then, noting that
for all s, equation (14) relates s m (x) to total surplus s(x, y) as
with
And by symmetry,
It follows that s(x,y) σ , sm ( 
and
Hence, tm(x,y)−Cm(x)
βσ and t f (x,y)−C f (y) (1−β)σ are in turn also identified given G 0 and λ on the support of α(x, y) (the matching set).
Discussion. Mean transfers (net of home production for singles) are proportional to the bargaining power coefficient (β for men, 1 − β for women). Clearly enough, the same transfer can be obtained with a better outside option and a lower β. Collective models do not separate these two sources of bargaining power within the family. Indeed, there is a one-to-one relationship between the minimal utility that the Pareto program assigns to household members and the equivalent utility weight (or the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier). In a bargaining model, however, the weight of each individual (log) surplus in the Nash program (β and 1 − β) is structurally independent of the minimal utility levels (or outside options). This superior flexibility calls for more data, as identifying β effectively requires separate data on the size of the cake to be shared between parties and the shares themselves. 12
With data on wages and matching, it is not possible to identify σ either. This is because the only information that is used to identify transfers is the frequency of marriage for any particular wage configuration. Marriage occurs in the model when
In absence of any additional information on the component C(x, y) of household production, allowing to anchor it on some known level, we can divide all terms of this equation by any positive number and the inequality remains true for all x, y.
Average total net transfers
Total consumption is the sum of earnings and home production. The consumption differential between married couples and singles is the sum of the earnings differential (already displayed in Figure 4 ) and total net transfers, C − C m − C f + z. From the preceding subsection, mean total net transfers follow as
and are thus identified up to the scaling factor σ given β, λ and G 0 . To use equations (25) and (26) for estimation, we set β = 0.5 and σ = 1000, the order of magnitude of monthly earnings. Moreover, we set G 0 equal to the CDF of a standard normal distribution (G 0 = Φ). 13 Computational details on the empirical implementation can be found in the appendix. There is strong assortative mating because C − C m − C f is doubly increasing (increasing in both directions of x and y). We also find that in absence of the match-specific effect, most marriages would not occur, as C − C m − C f is negative for most (x, y) combinations (all but the highest wages). 14 Thus, the effect of wages on couple formation is limited, which is in a way reassuring.
Home production time
In our model, marriage is entirely determined by home production. The graph of C −
C m − C f only indirectly helps characterize home production functions. What does it tell us about H − H m − H f ? By the Envelope theorem, home production times are related
. 14 Note that this result follows from the sign of C − C m − C f ; it is thus independent of the choice of σ.
(a) Total net transfers, (b) Home production differential, 
Hence
. Figure 8 shows the maps of these differentials. They are not very far from planes with the following monotonicity properties:
• k 1 m − k 0 m increases in x and decreases in y,
• k 1 f − k 0 f decreases in both x and y.
To get a sense of what this means, suppose that
with positive elasticities and with a 1 + b 1 ≤ 1 and a 0 , b 0 ≤ 1.
Then, simple algebra yields
where c 1 m , c 1 f , c 0 m , c 0 f are constants. It then follows that
Hence, one can expect k 1 m − k 0 m to increase with x and k 1
is consistent with home production functions being such that married women are more productive at home than single women and married men are significantly less productive than single men. In addition, women have a strong comparative advantage in home production in marriage (b 1 − a 1 > b 0 − a 0 + a 0 b 1 ). It is quite remarkable that we can thus deduce the specialization of married women in household production just by looking at wage distributions.
Lastly, note that the direct observation of home production time would allow us to identify σ and β, as the range of values of C − C m − C f obviously varies with σ (proportionality) and with β, to a lesser extent.
The sharing rule
We define the sharing rule as tm−Cm tm−Cm+t f −C f . It is identified given β, λ and G 0 , irrespective of σ. Figure 9 plots its estimate using the same calibrations of β, λ and G 0 as in the preceding sections. The median share of total transfers that goes to a married man with a median wage (2.6 in logs) is about one half, with some variance depending on his wife's wage. The same is true for a married woman with a median wage (around 2.4 in logs). This is expected given the arbitrary choice of 1/2 for β. However, it is most remarkable that the share of total net transfers that is appropriated by the man is much more responsive to his own wage or ability than to his wife's wage. Looking at the figure more closely, we see that a linear function of x and y would not be a bad approximation of the sharing rule, with a positive and steep slope in the x-direction (male wages), and flat in the y-direction, with a slope becoming negative only for high female wages.
Leisure
More able married men thus tend to get a bigger share of the surplus. Yet they work more than women. Without home production, the model could only make sense of these observations by assuming that men have a preference for work (i.e. leisure is an inferior good for them) and women have a preference for leisure. By decomposing non wage-labor time separately into leisure and home production activities, we can understand this result by the specialization of married women in home production.
Unfortunately, in absence of data on home production time we can only identify k 1 m − k 0 m and k 1 f − k 0 f up to scale. Assuming a value for β (1/2) and σ (1000), we now show one can proceed to identify and estimate income effects b m (x) and b f (y).
First, given k 1 m − k 0 m and k 1 f − k 0 f , the difference in leisure time between married men and single men is
Second, from equation (8), we deduce that
Averaging the match component z out, we obtain that
We will thus estimate income effects b m (x) by regressing ∆ m (x, y) on t m (x, y)−C m (x).
The corresponding population parameter is
with a similar expression for women. Figure 10 shows the estimated income effects, b m (x) and b f (y), obtained with β = 0.5 and σ = 1000, together with B m (x) and B f (y) (see appendix for estimation details). A low-order polynomial approximation is shown (dashed curves) for comparison. We thus find that leisure is a normal good for both men and women. However, for lower values of σ (say 500) we would obtain negative values for b m (x). If σ is too small then k 1 m − k 0 m is too small to compensate for the negative wedge in hours worked between married men and single men. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a prototypical version of a search-matching model of the marriage market with labor supply and home production. Our model extends the existing theoretical and empirical literature in two ways. By incorporating labor supply decisions and household production in Shimer and Smith's (2000) search-matching model, we provide a structural foundation for the surplus function driving the marriage decision. Inside households, the surplus is shared according to the balance of powers that is induced by external opportunities on the marriage market. This is a way of endogenizing the sharing rule driving decisions on time uses in Chiappori's collective model of the household. We derive the steady-state equilibrium and study the nonparametric identification of exogenous parameters from a cross-section of data on wages and hours worked, and we show that most of the underlying unknown parameters of interest can be identified. The model is rich of interesting lessons. Despite a low correlation between spouses' wages, we estimate a matching probability function that is strongly increasing in both wages, and we show how to learn from matching probabilities on the sharing rule and the response of home production to ability differences.
Many possible extensions of the model easily come to mind, like endogenizing divorce, either through shocks to z or via on-the-marriage search, or like allowing for other dimensions of heterogeneity but wages, or introducing public goods such and children (not substitutable to market goods). As far as heterogeneity is concerned, one issue is completely ignored in this paper, which for that reason is essentially a methodological contribution, namely unobserved heterogeneity correlating preferences and wages. This needs to be done if one credibly wants to evaluate such policies as WFTC or EITC. , but are more effectively calculated using FFT. A MATLAB code for DCT is, with y = (y 0 , ..., y n ): Y = y([1:n+1 n:-1:2],:); Y = real(fft(Y/2/n)); Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)]; f = @(x) cos(acos((2*x-(xmin+xmax))/(xmax-xmin)) *(0:n))*Y(1:n+1);
A bidimensional version is Y = y([1:n+1 n:-1:2],:); Y = real(fft(Y/2/n)); Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)]; Y = Y(:,[1:n+1 n:-1:2]); X = real(fft(X'/2/n)); Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)]'; f=@(x,y) cos(acos((2*x-(xmin+xmax))/(xmax-xmin))*(0:n))... *Y(1:n+1,1:n+1)... *cos((0:n)'*acos((2*y'-(ymin+ymax))/(ymax-ymin)));
The fact that the grid (x 0 , ..., x n ) is not uniform and is denser towards the edges of the support interval allows to minimize the interpolation error and thus avoids the standard problem of strong oscillations at the edges of the interpolation interval (Runge's phenomenon).
Another advantage of DCT is that, having calculated Y 0 , ..., Y n , then polynomial projections of y = (y 0 , ..., y n ) of any order p ≤ n are obtained by stopping the summation in (A.1) at k = p. Finally, it is easy to approximate the derivative f or the primitive´f simply by differentiating or integrating Chebyshev polynomials using if k ≥ 2.
In calculating an approximation of the derivative, it is useful to smoothen the function by summing over only a few polynomials. Derivatives are otherwise badly calculated near the boundary. Moreover, our experience is that the approximation: gave similar results as integrating the interpolated function.
